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A spectre is haunting Europe, the spectre of Eurocommunism.1 Moscow
denies that Eurocommunism exists. Washington fears that it is not a genuine
heresy. Both have been vainly attempting to contain it. Does Eurocommunism
exist? If so, what is it? What are its causes, present and future content,
and prospects? And what are its implications for Soviet and American
policies?
First, a provisional definition. In its narrower, West European sense
Eurocommunism is a European reformist version of radical Marxism which
emphasizes, in contrast to Leninism, the peaceful, parliamentary transition
to socialism led by a broad coalition of leftist forces and thereafter
allegiance to civil liberties, a multiparty system, and potential rotation
This preliminary survey and analysis is primarily based upon discussions
in Western Europe in June and early July 1976 and in Romania and Yugo-
slavia in September and October 1976. I am grateful to The Reader's Digest,
of which I am a roving editor and to its editor-in-chief Edward T. Thompson
for sponsoring my trip and to the Earhart and Carthage Foundations for
research support. The discussions which I had were so extensive and often
so confidential that I will not list their participants here. The subject
itself is so new that only one published study of it has yet appeared:
Neil McInnes, Euro-Communism, The Washington Papers, no. 37 (Beverly Hills
and London: Sage, 1976.) See also Pierre Hassner, "Les strategies de l'URSS
et des partis communistes en Europe Occidentale et Meridionale" (MS.,
mimeo., July 1975.) For background, see McInnes, The Communist Parties of
Western Europe (Oxford, 1975) and Donald L.M. Blackmer and Sidney Tarrow, eds.,
Communism in France and Italy (Princeton, 1975). I have drawn particularly
upon the work of, and discussions with, Kevin Devlin of Radio Free Europe,
Munich, and Wolfgang Berner of the Bundesinstitut fur ostwissenschaftliche
und internationale Studien, Cologne. I also profited from comments when I
read an earlier draft of this paper at the first meeting of the Eurocommunism
Study Group of the Harvard Center for European Studies on October 26, 1976.
See Devlin, "The Challenge of 'Eurocommunism,'" unpublished manuscript of
speech at NATO Defense College in Rome, September 1976. For a critical view
of Eurocommunism, see Walter Laqueur, "'Eurocommunism' and its Friends,"
Commentary, August 1976.
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of parties in office. However, Eurocommunism remains Marxist, advocates
large-scale nationalization of industry, supports the main lines of Soviet
foreign policy, and retains democratic centralism (i.e., elitism and banning
of factions) within the parties themselves. The center of the reformist
tendency is in the Italian and Spanish communist parties, with the French
party partially adhering to it. In its broader, pan-European sense Euro-
communism is national communism: it insists on the independence of all
communist parties, especially from Soviet domination. The center of this
broader aspect is in the Yugoslav and Italian parties, with the Romanians,
Spanish, and French allied with them.
The Historical Background
Most of the communist parties of the fully industrialized world are
beginning to turn away from Leninism back toward the mainstream of the
Marxist tradition, and even toward its later revisionist version. Karl
Marx was in one sense the first Eurocommunist and Lenin an elitist deviator
from Marx. Marx was a central European who wrote about the problems of
advanced capitalist societies. He knew little and cared less about the
problems of such underdeveloped societies as Imperial Russia with its tradition
of Byzantine, patrimonial autocracy, its lack of Renaissance, Reformation,
Enlightenment, or a large working class, and, given Tsarist police oppression,
its populist (narodnik) conspiracies and violence. 3
The nineteenth century homeland of Marxism, Germany, shared with the
main areas of today's Eurocommunism, Italy, Spain, and France, some character-
2
I owe this insight, as so many others, to my friend Richard Lwenthal.
3Richard Pipes, Russia under the Old Regime (N.Y.: Scribner's, 1974).
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istics different from the democratic lands of northern Europe: fewer
democratic traditions, late modernization, lack of a democratic social
revolution, the psychological alienation caused by very rapid industrializa-
tion and urbanization, and nationalism. Prosperity and absence of revolu-
tion later moved German Social Democracy toward reformism and nationalism.
Post-1945 West European prosperity also psychologically alienated
much of the working class and many intellectuals, drained off revolu-
tionary fervor, and again produced reformist Marxism and nationalism. Thus
the post-1918 split between communists and social democrats and the sub-
sequent Soviet domination and bolshevization of the Western European
communist parties, prolonged by West European communists' hatred of Nazism
and consequent attraction to the Soviet Union, may have been an atypical
interlude. The post-1945 period also saw the shift in the center of gravity
of West European communism from Germany to Italy and France, because of
the lack Cf a nasss base for communism in West Germany, the intensified anti-
communism of the West German Social Democrats, and the rigidity and sub-
jection to Moscow of communism in East Germany.
During the height of the Cold War, the West European dommunist parties
appeared to be rigidly pro-Soviet. The 1948 Soviet-Yugoslav break did not
seem at the time to make them less so. Yet even then, particularly in
Italy, Eurocommunism was beginning to develop under the surface. If one
were to look for the watershed in its development, one would probably choose
the near-unanimous West European communist condemnation of the 1968 Soviet
invasion of Czechoslovakia. However, it developed differently in each
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country and therefore can only be understood by studying each communist
party in turn.
After Stalin's death in 1953, the perceived threat of the Soviet
Union in Western Europe declined as East-West detente intensified, while
the image of the United States was deeply tarnished by the Vietnam War
and Watergate. In the early 1970s, the rise of Eurocommunism in Italy,
France, and Spain was greatly aided by the world-wide recession and the
quadrupling of the price of petroleum. These caused economic crises in
these countries, overshadowed the memories of post-1945 affluence, and
accentuated the psychological alienation which rapid economic development
had brought in its train.
The PCI
Far more than any other European communist party, the Italian communist
4party (Partito communista italiana--PCI) always held carefully limited
4Donald L.M. Blackmer, Unity in Diversity (Cambridge, Mass.: M.I.T. Press,
1968) and Donald L.M. Blackmer and Sidney Tarrow, Communism in Italy and France
(Princeton, 1975), especially chapter 1, Blackmer's "Continuity and Change
in Postwar Italian Communism;" Blackmer, "The International Strategy of
the Italian Communist Party" in Blackmer and Annie Kriegel, The International
Role of the Communist Parties of Italy and France (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard
Center for International Affairs, 1975), pp. 1-34; Kevin Devlin, "The
PCI's Long March through the Institutions," Radio Free Europe Research,
May 10, 1976; Blackmer, "Italian Communism: Strategy for the 1970s," Problems
of Communism, May-June 1972; Denis Mack Smith, "Une longue tradition de
'compromis historiques,'" Le Monde, June 18, 1976; and the running coverage
by Theodor Wieser in the Neue ZUrcher Zeitung, Hansjakob Stehle in Die Zeit,
and Robert Sole in Le Monde.
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heterodox views, due initially to the influence of Antonio Gramsci, a
major figure in the development of Western Marxism, who stressed revolution
by the working class' s cultural superiority (egemonia--
hegemony) and by consensus within a "historic bloc"-- a broad revolutionary
alliance . In both phenomena, he believed, revolutionary intellectuals
would play a major role.5 Palmiro Togliatti, its postwar leader, continued
to hold these views even when they were temporarily subnierged by Stalinism,
the Cominform, and the Cold War. He realized that the influence of the
Catholic Church and of the United States in postwar Italy precluded a
successful communist revolution and therefore made parliamentary struggle,
preferably in alliance with socialists and Christian Democrats, the only
realistic alternative. Finally, he believed that PCI successes at the local
level, gained by efficiency and moderation, would gradually bring success
at the national level as well.
Gradually, carefully, with Machiavellian skill, the PCI moved toward
autonomy from Moscow and domestic reformism. The landmarks in its develop-
ment were Togliatti's brief support of "polycentrism" in 1956, his increasingly
close relations with Tito, Togliatti's deathbed "Yalta testament" in 1964,
the PCI's condemnation of the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968, and
its slow but steady increase in local and regional power.
The PCI is transforming the Italian political scene by its gradual
movement from opposition toward participation in government. The post-1945
5John Cammett, Antonio Gramsci and the Origins of Italian Communism (Stanford,
1967); Eugene Genovese, "On Antonio Gramsci," Studies on the Left, March-
April 1967.
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Christian Democratic Italian ruling party (Democrazia cristiana--DC)
is factionalized, in part corrupt, and perhaps cannot be reformed. The
Italian economic crisis is so serious that, as in Great Britain, it cannot
be solved without the cooperation of the trade unions. Since the principal
Italian union, the CGIL, is effectively controlled by the PCI, this means
PCI support of and de facto participation at least in Italian domestic
economic policy.
The PCI has recently been steadily gaining local and regional power
and influence. It rules all the major Italian cities. It has made great
inroads amongst the Italian intelligentsia, notably the intellectuals and
the "collaborationist bourgeoisie," aided by the Italian tradition of
trasformismo-- going over to the winning side in time. Indeed, one is
struck in Italy by the parallels to the period before Mussolini, with the
DC playing the role of Giolitti and his successors and the PCI that of the
Fascists--"making the trains run on time."
The PCI leadership is now committed to a "democratic transitional
stage." It defines this as a "historical compromise" (compromesso storico):
a prolqcged period of electoral collaboration as well as competition among
and rule by all "working class parties," communist, socialist, and catholic,
in which the PCI would hopefully be the leading party but only if it won
the electoral competition. These "working class parties" must have a vast
majority in order to avoid a counterrevolutionary coup and foreign inter-
vention such as occurred, according to the PCI, in Chile. (Allende's
overthrow was a major factor in intensifying PCI reformism.)6 In fact,
6
Jcan Barth Urban, "Socialist Pluralism in Soviet and Italian Communist
Perspective: The Chilean Catalyst," Orbis, Summer 1974.
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the PCI's historical compromise means a DC-PCI coalition with the DC
initially in the majority, rather than a left coalition with the socialists,
which the PCI would dominate. The goal of this long transitional period
remains "socialism," but when and how it will be achieved, and what it will
be, is,presumably deliberately, left vague. Thus the PCI is neither social
democratic, because its goal remains socialization, nor Leninist, because
it no longer demands an elite vanguard role. These reformist views by now
probably accurately represent those of the majority of the PCI leadership
but probably not of the membership, which is considerably to the left
(i.e. more Leninist). The leadership is apparently trying to reeducate
its membership to this more reformist position.
The PCI's relations with the Soviet Union have seriously worsened,
notably as a result of Soviet criticism of its reformism and its advocacy
o f autonomy for all communist parties and regional cooperation among them.7
Its &lose relations with the League of Yugoslav Communists (LCY) are the core
of the autonomial aspects of Eurocommunism. Those with the Spanish Communist
Party are particularly close and the core of the reformist aspects of
Eurocommunism. Those with the Romanian Communist Party are also good.
7Joan Barth Urban, "Communism Italian Style in Soviet Perspective," a
paper presented at the New England Slavic Association Conference, April
30-May 1, 1976. For the disputed issue of continued Soviet financing of
the PCI, see Michael Ledeen and Claire Sterling, "Italy's Russian Sugar
Daddies," New Republic, April 3, 1976 and the reply to such charges by
Gianni Cervetti and Guido Cappelloni in L'Unita, April 11, 1976. See also
Kevin Devlin, "Italians, Yugoslavs React Sharply to Soviet Attack. on
'Revisionism,"' Radio Free Europe Research, March 25, 1976 and Cervetti's
rejection of Suslov's veiled attack on the PCI (Pravda, March 18, 1976) in
L'Unita, March 28, 1976. Cf. Marchais' rejection in L'Humanit/, March 19, 1976.
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In late 1975 the French Communist Party moved closer to these views. The
PCI's leader Enrico Berlinguer gave public endorsement, during the recent
Italian parliamentary election campaign,to Italian membership in NATO as a
8
favorable context for socialism in Italy8. It probably reflected not only
electoral considerations but also the concern of all Italian parties
lest Moscow reacquire control over post-Tito Yugoslavia. Such a develop-
ment would deprive the PCI of its major ally in its struggle against
Soviet domination and thus effectively break the power of Eurocommunism and
endanger the present PCI leadership.
The PCE
A similar and overtly more frankly expressed evolution has gone on
AJ 9
in the Spanish communist party (Partido comunista espanol--PCE). The bitter
struggles during the Spanish Civil War between the communists on the one
hand and the socialists and anarchists on the other, the failure of post-
8 Corriere della Sera, June 15, 1976. The carefully worded passage on NATO
was omitted in the L'UnitA version of the interview (so as not to alarm the
base?) but Berlinguer repeated his statement on Italian television.
I have relied here primarily upon two studies by our student Eusebio Mujal-
Leon, "Spanish Communism in the 1970s," Problems of Communism, March-April
1975, pp. 43-56 and "The Political Objectives of the Communist Party
of Spain: A Clandestine Challenge to Soviet Hegemony," presented at the
April 30-May 1, 1976 meeting at Storrs, Connecticut, of the New England
Slavic Association. Mr. Mujal-Len is preparing a dissertation on the
PCE. See also Heinz Timmermann, "Spaniens Kommunisten auf dem Weg in
die Legalitat," Ostauropa, February 1976. For background see Arnold
Hottinger, Spain in Transition: Franco's Regime and Spain in Transition:
Prospects and Policies, The Washington Papers, nos. 18 and 19 (Beverly Hills
and London; Sage, 1974.)
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1945 PCE guerrillas, and the subsequent almost total dependence of the
PCE on Moscow, because of its clandestinity and Stalin's tyranny, made
the Spanish socialists and anarchists after 1945 refuse to collaborate with
it. Later, the approaching end of the Franco era, the prospects for its
legalization thereafter, and the greater opportunities for its clandestine
operations in late Francoist Spain moved the PCE toward nationalism and
reformism. Finally, because its strength was only about half that of the
main socialist party, the PSOE, the PCE was subject to pressure on its
right, which also pushed it toward reformism.
The PCE therefore endorsed peaceful decompression from the Francoist
dictatorship to a multiparty parliamentary democracy, within which the
transition to socialism would be long and through an electoral majority.
These policies led to a clash with Moscow, made the more severe by Soviet
overestimation of its power over a small, clandestine, Soviet-financed
party and by Spanish pride and long-endured humiliation. In the mid-1960s
the PCE, led by Santiago Carrillo, who was supported by its grande dame
Dolores Ibarurri ("La Pasionaria" of Civil War fame), began to push for
independence from the Soviets, a tendency also favored by its illusionary
hopes for the 1968 Czechoslovak "socialism with a human face." Even before
that the PCE had established good relations with the PCI and the Romanians.
(One should remember that in 1944 the Romanian dictator Marshall Antonescu had
tried to establish an axis with Mussolini, Franco, and Petain to bring
about a compromise peace.) The PCE had also criticized the Soviet repression
of Sinyavskii and Daniel. In all of this, it also reflected the general
Spanish desire to "return to Europe."
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Moscow thereupon partially and unsuccessfully supported a pro-Soviet
splinter group, led by the CivilWar general Enrique Lister, against the
PCE leadership--a "splittist" move comparable to Soviet efforts to split
the Japanese, Australian, and New Zealand communist parties and to Soviet
covert efforts to subvert the Yugoslav communist leadership. The PCE
retaliated by moving close to other autonomist communist parties, the Cuban,
Japanese, North Vietnamese, and North Korean, as well as to the Italian,
Yugoslav, and Romanian parties, Uniquely among Eurocommunist parties, the
PCE also tried, with significant if only partial success, to reestablish
relations with the Chinese. Finally, and for the Soviets most menacingly,
Carrillo and his associates uniquely developed an ideological framework not
only for the independence of each communist party from "all others" (i.e.
the Soviets) but also for a "regional" (i.e. Eurocommunist) strategy: an alliance
of European communist parties which would work within the European Economic
Community, reject Soviet sacrifice of revolution in Western Europe for detente
with the United States and West European capitalist governments, and aim
toward a group of European socialist states independent of the Soviet Union
as well as the United States. Moscow initially violently attacked these
"incorrect and absurd" theses, which allegedly "reeked with nationalism."
In late 1974, however, within the context of much stronger Eurocommunist
resistance to Soviet pressure, Moscow accepted an uneasy coexistence with
the PCE, largely on the latter's terms.
The PCF
In Italy and Spain nationalism has historically been centered in the
right. The left has been internationalist and therefore little able to profit
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from playing the nationalist card. In France, ever since the Jacobin
nationalism of the French Revolution, the situation has been the reverse:
the modern French nationalist tradition has been more left than right and
the French right was discredited by the collaboration of much of it with
the Nazis. Yet until 1973 the servile subordination of the French Communist
Party (Parti communiste frangais--PCF)10 to the Soviets plus De Gaulle's
French nationalism long made it impossible for the PCF to play the French
nationalist card. But the departure of De Gaulle, the growing
structural problems of French economics and society, and the skill of the
socialist leader Franjois Mitterand produced the amazing revival of the
French left and above all of the socialist party (Parti socialiste--PS).
The PS is now much more powerful than the PCF. It threatens the PCF from
the left (by its support of workers self-administration of factories--
autogestion) as well as from the social democratic right. It is the dominant
force in the primarily PS-PCF Union de la gauche, which may well win a
majority in the 1978 parliamentary elections and which nearly won, with
Mitterand as its candidate, the last presidential election. The PCF has
therefore been pushed, like the PCE, toward reformism by its fear of rising
1 0Ronald Tiersky, "French Communism in 1976," Problems of Communism,
January-February 1976 and French Communism 1920-1972 (N.Y.: Columbia,
1974); Franois Fejt'o, The French Communist Party and the Crisis of
Internationar Communism, (Cambridge, Mass.: M.I.T. Press, 1967); Annie
Kriegel, "The French Communist Party and the Fifth Republic," inilackmer
and Tarrow, eds., Communism in Italy and France, chapter 2; Andre Harris
and Alain de S adouy, Voyage l'interieur du Parti communiste (Paris:
Seuil, 1974.)
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socialist power, and also toward nationalism by its desire, like the PCI
and the PCE, to play the nationalist card, and by its ability, unlike the
other two,to play it effectively. Finally, in recent years the PCF membership
and cadres have been extensively rejuvenated, which also furthered its
move away from a totally pro-Soviet position.
The PCP
The Portuguese Communist Party (Partido comunista portugues--PCP)
is not Eurocommunist; it opposes thatstrongly. But its recent
activities became a .;ajor subject of controversy with the Eurocommunists.
The Soviet attitude toward the PCP illuminated Moscow's attitude toward
Eurocommunism as well. Finally, its 1975 defeat favored the Eurocommunist view
of the impracticality of a revolutionary strategy in Western Europe. The
PCP became steeled, Stalinist, and rigid in its devotion to revolution
during its long years of clandestinity and police persecution under Salazar.
Its leader, Alvaro Cunhal, in Portuguese jails from many years and then in
Soviet-financed emigration in Prague, was totally hostile to reformism,
determined to achieve power by revolution, and had crushed the brief
reformist tendencies in the PCP in the 1950s. (Conversely, the other pre-
1 1See Arnold Hottinger, "The Rise of Portugal's Communists," Problems of
Communism, July-August 1975, "Die 'Unterseboot-Taktik' der portugugesischen KP.
Details zu einem zweijahrigen Machtkampf,"Neue2Zurcher Zeitung, April 19,
1976, his regular coverage in the Neue Zurcher Zeitung; and Eusebio Mujal-
Leon, "The PCP and the Portuguese Revolution" (MS., M.I.T., October 1976)
of which a condensed version will be published in the January-February 1977
Problems of Communism. See also the running coverage in Expresso (Lisbon).
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Salazar parties were broken by police repression.)
Uniquely in western Europe, the 1974 military coup which overthrew Salazar,
the result of the unsuccessful, open-ended colonial African war, was
carried out by officers many of whom had been infected by leftist ideologies,
including especially those of their African guerrilla opponents. The political
right and the Catholic Church were discredited by their collaboration with
Salazar and the center-left parties had been broken by police repression.
The PCP could thus hope to ally with the radical officers to grasp power.
Why did the PCI's strategy fail? Most of the army finally placed its
unity over revolution. The PCP's base was only among the workers in Lisbon
and the landless agricultural laborers of the southern latifundia, while
the north was Catholic and conservative. Finally, the west European social
democratic parties, notably the SPD, had aided in the establishment and
financing of Mario Soares' Portuguese Socialist Party (PSP), the only non-
regional Portuguese party.
After the 1974 coup in Lisbon, the MFA (the coup officers) rapidly moved
to the left and parts of it allied with the reemerged PCP. The coup had also
let loose several extreme radical groups to the left of the PCP, notable
for their organizational discipline and their factional feuding. The Soviets,
perhaps initially reluctant to support fully the PCP's all-out drive for
power, and as always trying for a "controlled disintegration of Western
Europe and keeping all their options open, were dragged along with it.
By summer 1975 Moscow probably, albeit erroneously, thought that the
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PCP could win, and endorsed its revolutionary strategy.12 Conversely, the
PCP's anti-parliamentarism and pro-Sovietism pushed the PCI and the PCE
to condemn it publicly. The PCF supported it, but the PS did not. The
SPD and the Swedish Social Democrats effectively supported the
PSP, while Dr. Kissinger incorrectly thought that the PCP had won, or would
win, in which case Western Europe would get a salutory lesson.
Sheer political incompetence was certainly one of the main causes
for the failure of the radical officers, the PCP, and the radical leftist
parties to seize power in Lisbon in 1975. There were other, deeper ones
as well. Only the socialists (the PSP), led by Mario Soares, had a nation-
wide base and were therefore the strongest party. Above all, as the anti-
communist demonstrations in the north in 1975 showed, Portugal was still
too much an underdeveloped, conservative Catholic country for the PCP to
come to power by legal means.
The Essential East European Component1 3
The history of the Yugoslav and Romanian nationalist deviation from
12Joan Barth Urban, "Contemporary Soviet Perspectives on Revolution in the
West," Orbis, Winter 1976; Gerhard Wettig, "Entspannungs- und Klassenpolitik.
Das sowjetische Verhalten gegenuier Portugal," Beitra'ge zur Konfliktforschung
no. 1, 1976; Hassner, "Les strategies de l'URSS et des parties communistes
en Europe Occidentale et Meridionale," pp. 15, 17.
l3I have benefitted greatly from participation in the first Romanian-
American roundtable conference in Bucharest, September 29-October 1, 1976
and the second Yugoslav-American rounidtable conference in Dubrovnik, October
4-7, 1976, from the analyses of Romania by Robert King of Radio Free Europe and
Viktor Meier of the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, and of Yugoslavia by
Slobodan Stankovic of Radio Free Europe. See also Jacob Walkin, "Yugoslavia
after the 10th Party Congress," Survey, Winter. 1976.
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Moscow need not be summarized here. Romania is historically anti-
Russian and parts of Yugoslavia are as well. Stalin broke with Tito
because Tito, the proud leader of a successful guerrilla struggle, would
not accept total subordination to Moscow. Romania, more vulnerable to
Soviet pressure,has wriggled out from under total Soviet domination by
great skill in maneuver, maintenance of domestic Leninist orthodoxy,
use of the Sino-Soviet split, and U.S. support. Moscow persistently tried
(after 1953) to get Tito to return to the fold and later to limit or
reverse the Romanian deviation.
Romanian relations with Moscow remain characterized by tactical maneuvers
on Ceau escu's part, retreating when Soviet pressure becomes too great
but fundamentally maintaining the Romanian nationalist15 deviation, and
attempting to consolidate it further by rapprochement with Yugoslavia,
1 4See Stephen Fischer-Galati, The New Rumania: From People's Democracy to
Socialist Republic (Cambridge, Mass.: M.I.T. Press, 1967), and Twentieth
Century Romania (N.Y.: Columbia University Press, 1970); and John Michael
Montias, Economic Development in Communist Rumania (Cambridge, Mass.: M.I.T.
Press, 1967); Adam Ulam, Titoism and the Cominform (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard
University Press, 1952); Viktor Meier, "Yugoslav Communism" in William E.
Griffith, ed., Communism in Europe, vol. 1 (Cambridge, Mass.: M.I.T. Press,
1964); and "The political Dynamics of the Balkans in 1974" in William E.
Griffith, ed., The World and the Great Power Triangles (Cambridge, Mass.:
M.I.T. Press, 1975); A. Ross Johnson, Yugoslavia: In the Twilight of Tito,
The Washington Papers, no. 16 (Beverly Hills and London: Sage, 1974);
Zdenko Antic, "The League of Communists of Yugoslavia and the PCI," Radio
Free Europe Research, Sept. 24, 1971.
1 5For an ideological justification, see Alexandru Tanase, "The Permanence
of the Nation and the Real Significance of Internationalism," Lumea, April 1,
1976 (FBIS/EE/April 15, 1976/H8-14.) See also "On the Relations Among the
Socialist Countries, Among the Communist and Workers' Parties," Scinteia,
April 24, 1976 (FBIS/EE/April 26, 1976/Hl-6), quoting not only Zagladin
but also LCY, PCF, PCI and JCP sources.
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good relations with the West and with Peking, and more. recently by ties
with the non-aligned world.
Tito remains a communist, if a heterodox one. His global ambitions,
not satisfied by his major role in the nonaligned movement and by his good
relations with the West, require that he also be reaccepted in the communist
world--but only on his terms: reaffirmation of the complete autonomy of
every communist party and Soviet toleration of his own heterodox policy
positions. Tito has long had close links with the PCI, which has always opposed
Soviet pressure on Belgrade. The Romanians have retained good relations
with the Chinese. (The PCI and the PCE have for the last decade also resisted
Soviet efforts to obtain a collective excommunication of Peking out of fear
that Soviet pressure would thereafter be intensified against them.) After
the 1968 Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia, the Chinese stopped their attacks
on the Yugoslavs and correct state (albeit not party) relations were
reestablished between Belgrade and Peking. The remarkably warm PCF declara-
tion on the occasion of Mao Tse-tung's death demonstrated the same tendency.
The two other significant western European communist parties, the
Greek and Finnish, are split. Although one might have expected that the
collapse of the Greek colonels would have given a major opportunity to the
Greek communists, their split, their past identification with the Yugoslav-
sponsored Greek civil war and Belgrade's proposed detachment of part of
northern Greece ("Aegean Macedonia"), the competition of the radical left
led by Andreas Papandreou, and the magisterial, charismatic personality of
Konstantin Karamanlis have made them politically nearly impotent. The
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other west European communist parties are of no political significance.
Most of them, including the British, Belgian, and Scandinavian16 have
supported the PCI-PCE reformist line. The West German party (Deutsche
kommunistische Partei--DKP) is small, politically impotent, and a creature
of East Berlin and Moscow.
Eurocommunism Today
1. Italy. The June 1976 Italian parliamentary elections were another
step in the long, slow march of the PCI through the Italian political
institutions toward eventual participation in the government. Neither the
DC nor the PCI ever contemplated that they would result in the PCI's entry
into the government. (That was a non-Italian illusion.) The DC and the
PCI both won, the former at the cost of its small rightwing allies and the
latter of the socialists (Partito socialista italiano--PSI). The PCI's
victory was more important because the weakened PSI then refused to renew
the center-left coalition lest it lose even more of its left to the PCI and
of its right to the DC. Italy thus became arithmetically ungovernable
against the opposition of the PCI. The first of the three probable stages
of PCI entry into the government, "programmatic accord" (accordo programmatico)
thereupon partially occurred: a much larger role for the PCI in parliamentary
committees. (The second, PCI support of and participation in the majority
16Per Egil Hegge, "'Disunited' Front in Norway," Problems of Communism,
May-June 1976, and Richard Cornell, "Studies on Nordic Communism," Problems
of Communism, May-June 1976. See also Trond Gilberg, "Patterns of Nordic
Communism," Problems of Communism, May-June 1975, pp. 20-35.
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but not in the government--maggioranza, and the third, participation in
a DC-dominated government--participazione, lie in the future.)
The importance of this should not be exaggerated. For five years
or more no major law has passed the Italian parliament without the
informal agreement of the PCI. The change is that this has now become more
formalized, institutionalized, and public. The drift toward PCI
participazione continues.
2. Spain. Political decompression, as de Tocqueville remarked
about pre-1789 France, is the most difficult of all political arts. It
is therefore remarkable that as of this writing (late October 1976)
the post-Franco decompression in Spain is going more smoothly than most
analysts would probably have predicted. King Juan Carlos and his advisers
seem to be moving with but not overwhelmed by the winds of change. The
oppositional political parties, including the PCE, bark more than they bite.
The army, although skeptical, is so far quiet. The Church favors decom-
pression. The economic situation is serious but compared to Italy and Great
Britain it is probably controllable. The memory of the Spanish Civil War
and more recently of the near-anarchy in Portugal favor peaceful change,
as does the Spanish consensus for integration into Western Europe. Finally,
the strong impulses toward regionalism, notably in Catalonia and the
Basque region, produce a Castilian consensus, especially in the army,
against radical or rapid change.
The main PCE bases in Spain are the unofficial but important
comisiones obreras and its own clandestine apparatus. Even so, the PSOE
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remains more powe rful in the working class. The nascent Christian Democratic
party is aided by the pro-reformist position of the Church hierarchy.
Although the PCE may well be legalized within a year or so, the army
has so far prevented this, as was most recently shown by denials of entry
visas to Carrillo and Ibarruri. This move was more symbolic than decisive,
however; the rest of the PCE leadership is free to return to Spain, has done
so, and is active there. At its recent central committee plenum in Rome the
party emerged from clandestinity, revealed all of its leadership, and formally
declared its desire to integrate itself into a democratic, parliamentary
Spanish political system. That many if not most of its cadres, like those
of the PCI, would prefer a more leftist course is probably true but not
the main point: the political situation in Spain continues to work against
a revolutionary and for a reformist PCE strategy, as do developments within
the international communist world.
3. France. The great turn in PCF policy, although foreshadowed
before, came in the autumn of 1975; the party--for tactical reasons--
moved toward autonomy from the Soviets and reformism at home.17 The move
began in mid-November with a joint PCF-PCI declaration in which the PCF
17See the authoritative analysis by Annie Kriegel, "Le PC frangais veut
sinc'rement changer," Le Point, June 21, 1976; Kevin Devlin, "The PCF's
Tur ning-point Congress," Radio Free Europe Research, February 4, 1976 and "The
French CP's 'New Look' Congress," ibid., February 10, 1976, and McInnes,
Euro-Communism, pp. 12-26, 54-55, as well as the excellent running coverage
in Le Monde.
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substantially endorsed the PCI positions. Almost simultaneously, at
one of the East Berlin preparatory meetings for the European communist
conference, the PCF shifted its support from Moscow to the Yugoslavs
and Italians. In December the PCF publicly criticized Soviet labor camps.
In January it officially abandoned the dictatorship of the proletariat.
In February 1976 neither Suslov nor Ponomarev, exceptionally, attended
the PCF 22nd Congress, where Marchais reafirmed the new PCFpositions.
Later that month Marchais did not attend the CPSU 25th Congress. (Neither
did Carrillo, Berlinguer did but had to threaten to walk out to resist
Soviet proposals for deletions from his speech.) In April the PCF
abandoned its opposition to France's nuclear deterrent and Marchais paid a
cordial visit to the Japanese Communist Party, which had previously broken
with the Soviets.
However, the PCF maintained democratic centralism and a leftist
extremist foreign policy--violently anti-American and pro-national libera-
tion movement. Moreover, its new nationalism--as Marchais put it, "aux
couleurs de la France"-- led it to attack, in the East Berlin negotiations
and elsewhere, Soviet coexistence with Giscard and Bonn and to continue to
attack NATO and the EEC.
There have been four other new developments. First, although the
PCF's move toward autonomy from the Soviet Union, in my view probably
strategic, and its emphasis on domestic democracy, in my view primarily
tactical, continue apace, they have not yet resulted in gains vis-a-vis
the PS, which remains the stronger party in the Union de la gauche. Second,
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polls indicate that the left coalition has a good chance of winning the
next parliamentary elections. Presumably in part for this reason President
Giscard d'Estaing recently replaced his Gaullist prime minister Chirac by the
nonparty RaymondB arre--a move intended to move his government more toward
the center and thus make it better able to compete with the leftist
coalition. Third, there have been some signs of reappraisals of the past
by the PCF intellectuals.18 Fourth, the PCF continues to modify its
opposition to NATO and the EEC. France's current problems, however,
remain primarily economic, as the recent weakness of the franc indicated,
and they are if anything getting worse, not better. The tension between
the PCF and the PS is still strong under the surface and emerges from time
to time into public view. It is likely to continue as long as the PS is
superior in numbers and claims ideological primacy and the PCF refuses to
abandon its claim to a vanguard role among the working-class parties.
4. Portugal is now in the midst of a democratic Theridor. As
in Brazil and Chile, the Portuguese military, led by the new President,
Gen. Eanes, eventually chose discipline and moderation rather than euphoric
utopian undisciplined revolution and crushed the attempted November 1975
coup by the leftist radical officer Otelo de Carvalho. The present
monocolore Soares socialist government has grave economic problems.
1 8By Louis Althusser (Le Monde, May 12, 1976); Jean Ellenstein, Le P.C.
(Paris: Grasset, 1976), reviewed in Le Monde, September 2, 1976; and
Fransois Cohen in La Nouvelle Critique, May 1976, reviewed in Le Monde,
June 23, 1976.
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But the Portuguese economy is small enough, and the incentives for Washing-
ton and Bonn to aid it, after the defeat of the PCP, are so great, that it
can probably be managed. The PPD (now renamed the Portuguese Social
Democratic Party) and the more conservative CDS, the parties to Soares'
right, in fact support the Soares government, which is solely socialist primarily
to placate the PSP leftwing which has, however, been largely excluded from
ministerial positions. Soares continues to talk like Frangois Mitterand
but acts more like Helmut Schmidt.
The Soviet PCP model of revolutionary takeover thus failed
ignominously in Portugal. It did, however, have for the Soviets one
important result: in the brief period of radical predominance the PCP
and the radical officers turned over power in Luanda to the MPLA and
in Lourenco Marques (now Maputo) to Frelimo, thus greatly aiding Soviet
influence in both. But in Portugal and in West Europe in general the
PCP's failure hurt Moscow and strengthened Eurocommunism.
One should not, however, expect a rapid or decisive change in the
PCP. Its leadership, steeled by clandestinity, Soviet support, and emigra-
tion, is in its late 60s. The transition of the PCP toward Eurocommunism,
although eventually likely, will be slow. In any case, the PCP has sunk
into at least temporary political insignificance on the Portuguese and
international scene, where its main importance is as a negative




As the PCF leader Marchais recently remarked, Eurocommunism is a
misnomer because it does not include the Japanese Communist Party (JCP.)
(Or, one might add, the Australian as well.) Recent developments in the
JCP19 have been strikingly similar to those in the Eurocommunist parties.
The dictatorship of the proletariat has been abandoned; civil liberties
and multiparty pluralism under socialism affirmed; and the vanguard role
abandoned. Internationally, the JCP has long since rejected any privileged
role for the Soviet Union, demanded that Moscow return the four southern
Kurile islands to Japan, kept equidistant and equally hostile between
Moscow and Peking, and successfully warded off efforts by both to split
it.
The developments in the Australian comnunist party (ACP) have been
similar but its anti-Soviet position even more extreme, and Moscow has now
officially recognized a pro-Soviet group rather than the ACP. (The
pro-Maoist group there, as elsewhere, is now insignificant.) 20
Eurocommunism thus is a phenomenon characteristic of the development
of communist parties in all advanced industrial societies. It centers in
1 9Kevin Devlin, "Japanese CP to Drop 'Marxism-Leninism,"' Radio Free Europe
Research, June 4, 1976.
20I have relied here on conversations in Australia in August 1976.
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Western Europe, and its main characteristics have developed there first,
but the impulses elsewhere are the same. Indeed, the 1968 Prague Spring
may also be seen as a brief, doomed experiment in Eurocommunism.
The 1976 European Communist Conference
Eurocommunism was partially institutionalized by the June 1976 East
Berlin European communist conference. Initiated by the Soviets as an
attempt to check it and to mobilize against the Chinese, it turned
out on balance to be a Soviet defeat and an affirmation of autonomy and
revisionism by several major European communist parties.
Why did the Soviets want the conference? The two previous ones,
world-wide in 1960 and European in 1969, had also documented the gradual
decline of Soviet dominance in the international communist world. At
the 1969 conference some parties refused to sign the declaration and
others, including the Italian and Romanian, signed either parts only
or made reservation. But Moscow, and particularly the Soviet party
bureaucracy concerned with inter-party relations, apparently still
think it important for Soviet domestic and foreign legitimacy that
such conferences take place and that a document be produced which
at least endorses, as the 1976 one did, the major lines of Soviet
foreign policy.
For communists as for all other politicians, the organizational
issue is always primary. As Lenin put it, kto kogo--who does what
to whom? Organizationally, the preparations for the 1976 conference
differed from the previous ones in two key aspects: the participation,
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for the first time since 1957, of Yugoslavia, and the rule of consensus
(i.e. unanimity), agreed on at the first working group meeting in
Warsaw in October 1974. The Soviets wanted the Yugoslavs to participate
to show Tito's return to "the movement" and thereby to get Yugoslav
support for their policies. The Yugoslavs wanted to participate in
order to increase their own influence in "the movement," to decrease
Soviet pressure on them, and thereby, as in their non-aligned policy,
to increase their own independence and freedom of maneuver. The PCI
wanted the Yugoslavs to participate in order to strengthen the autonomist
current in the movement.
In retrospect, it seems clear, in my view, that the basic
results of the 1976 conference were foreshadowed at the first preparatory
meeting, in Warsaw in October 1974. The most important challenge
to the Soviets there was by Grlickov, the Yugoslav representative, on
policy and organizational issues. As to the former, he declared
that dissimilar roads to socialism and divergencies in the international
communist movement are objectively inevitable; that non-alignment is
objectively necessary and both anti-imperialist and "anti-hegemonistic"
(i.e. against Soviet hegemony); that sovereignty, equality, non-interference
and regard for national interests represent the "social and political
content of proletarian internationalism" (thereby redefining the term
in a sense contrary to the Soviet use of it); and that therefore there
can be no recognition of a center, institutionalization of international
consultations, or binding documents issuing from the conference. He
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then listed the Yugoslav requirements for the meeting. It must be
public. It must not represent a continuation of any previous conferences
(i.e. at which the LCY had been absent and/or condemned.) It must not
discuss the convocation of an international conference (which Moscow
wanted.) There must be no result of non-participation by any party (i.e.
no collective mobilization against the Chinese.) Finally, and organizationally
most importantly, all decisions must be taken by consensus (i.e. unanimously.) 2 1
The Romanian representative, Stefan Andrei, echoed the Yugoslav
insistence on national and party independence.22 So, less sharply, did the
PCI's Pajetta, who specifically endorsed consensus and, although denying
any intention of a West European communist center, did say that "the
European West needs ... to lay down in new terms its relations with the
United States and the socialist countries, the non-aligned countries,
23
and the developing world.,,2 Reportedly, Ponomarev, the Soviet representative,
21
*Text: Socialist Thought and Practice (Belgrade), October 1974, pp. 44-54.
22Scinteia, October 22, 1976.
23, TL'nita, October 17, 1974. For analyses of the meeting, see Kevin
bevlin in Radio Free Europe Survey of East European Developments,
January 17, 1975, pp. 9-18; Heinz Timmermann, "Zur Warschauer Konferenz,"
Deutschland Archiv, November 1974; McInnes, Euro-Communism, pp. 55-59;
Milorad Popov, "'Eurocommunism' and the pan-European Conference," The
World Today, Oct. 1976.
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unexpectedly accepted the Yugoslav conditions2 4 --in retrospect, a Soviet
blunder which Moscow never succeeded in reversing. The Soviets probably
thought that by pressure they could backtrack later, and the subsequent
eighteen months saw them try to do so more than once, accompanied by
veiled but clear polemics against the Eurocommunist positions.2 5
2 4 This was made clear, as to consensus, by Skrinjar in Komunist (Belgrade),
November 4, 1974 (FBIS/EE/November 4, 1974), 18-9 and by Grlizkov at the
December 20, 1974 Budapest preparatory meeting, in Socialist Thought and
Practice, December 1974, at p. 11.
2 5The most important Soviet articles were: K. Zarodov, "Lenin's Strategy
and Tactics of Revolutionary Struggle," Pravda, August 6, 1975 (Current
Digest of the Soviet Press, August 27, 1975, pp. 15, 17.)# V.V. Zagladin
(Deputy Chief, International Department, CPSU Secretariat), "The Pre-
conditions of Socialism and the Struggle for Socialism," Voprosy filosofii,
no. 10, 1975 (FBIS/SOV/December 10, 1975/Al-13 and December 19, 1975/
Al-16; Vitaly Korionov, "Communists' Banner," Pravda, January 24, 1976,
(FBIS/SOV/January 28, 1976/Al-4); Suslov in Pravda and Izvestiya March 18, 1976
(FBIS/SOV/March 18, 1976, R1-4) (N.B.: one'key passage, "...everything the
opportunists present as some 'regional' or 'national' versions of Marxism
have nothing in common with revolutionary theory and do harm to the cause
of the working class" was carried by Izvestiya but not by Pravda); Zagladin,
"Internationalism--the Banner of Communists," Pravda, April 20, 1976
(Information Bulletin, no. 9, 1976); analysis: F. Stephen Larrabee,
"Zagladin and the Inter-Party Debate," Radio Liberty Research, May 4, 1976);
Boris Ponomarev (Chief, International Department, CPSU Secretariat),
"International Significance of the 25th CPSU Congress," World Marxist
Review, May 1976; Boris Vesnin (reportedly a pseudonym for Zagladin),
"Proletarian Internationalism and its Bourgeois Opponents," New Times,
no. 24, June 1976; Vesnin, "For Peace and Social Progress," ibid., no. 27,
July 1976. See the running analyses by Kevin Devlin and his summary and
analysis in Radio Free Europe Survey of East European Developments,
August 5, 1976. See also in general Robert Legvold, "The Soviet Union and
Western Europe," in William E. Griffith, ed., The Soviet Empire: Expansion
and Detente (Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Books, 1976), pp. 217-258 and
Kevin Devlin, "The Interparty Drama," Problems of Communism, July-August
1975.
-28-
The organizational struggle publicly centered on the issues
of the Leninist concept of proletarian internationalism, the general
line of the movement, and the dictatorship of the proletariat. Soviet
support of these expressed Moscow's claim to hegemony or at least to
the position of primus inter pares in the movement and its insistence
on the general validity of the Leninist model of elitist authoritarianism.
The autonomists' rejection of the first two symbolized their claim to
independence and equality and the reformists' rejection of the third
highlighted their move away from Leninism.
The Italians, Spanish, and British also supported a domestic reformist
line, rejecting the dictatorship of the proletariat for a parliamentary
transition to a pluralist socialist society. The French party, drawing
on the Jacobin nationalist tradition, opposed Soviet detente policy insofar
as it led Moscow to favor Giscard over the PCF, pursue rapprochement with
Bonn, and modify its opposition to the EEC.
In late 1975, as we have seen, the French, for tactical reasons,
took over the revisionist position of the PCI on domestic politics and
26
vis-a-vis the Soviets in the European conference context. (By that
time, also, the Portuguese party had lost its bid for power in Lisbon,
and the PCF's support of it, and the PCI's and PCE's opposition to it,
26%See the joint PCF-PCI declaration in L'Unita and L'Humanite, November 18,
1976 and Le Monde, November 19, 1975.
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were no longer an issue.) The final acceptance by Moscow of the substance
of the Eurocommunist positions took place during the visit of Soviet
party secretary Katushev to Belgrade at the end of May 1976.
The European communist conference, held on June 29 and 30 in East
Berlin, marked a new stage in the opening up of the communist movement
to public gaze. At the insistence of the PCI and other parties, all
the proceedings were seen, via closed-circuit television, by foreign
correspondents. Neues Deutschland, the organ of its East German hosts,
had to print the full text of all the speeches. The declaration gave no
special status to the Soviets. It endorsed dialogue with other
"progressive" forces (i.e. social democrats and Catholics) and (an
important bow to the Yugoslavs) non-alignment. Some of the speakers,
notably Berlinguer and Carrillo, specifically repudiated any Soviet claim
to hegemony, set forth their reformist views in great detail, and
insisted that the declaration had no binding force. Berlinguer and
Marchais specifically rejected the idea of holding another such conference.
The final declaration was not signed and was not binding.
The Soviet defeat at the conference was made clear by the absence of
27
all the three key Soviet formulations in the conference's declaration and
by its strong affirmation of the independence of each party.
On the credit side of the ledger from the Soviet viewpoirt, the
conference did meet, and it unanimously adopted a document which endorsed
the main lines of Soviet foreign policy. (As to the support of national
2 7See top of p. 28, supra.
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liberation struggles, the Euroconmunists were the more positive because
this would shield them from Soviet charges of revisionism.) Thus the myth of
unanimity, so important for Soviet legitimacy, was in part preserved. As
to the organizational and ideological differences which the conference high-
lighted, the Soviet press censored the references to them in the autonomists'
speeches and reaffirmvd proletarian internationalism and the dictatorship
of the proletariat, after the conference, as though they had been endorsed
in the declaration. However, the autonomists and revisionists also reaffirmed
their viewpoints. The sharp polemics in September 1976 between the Italian
and Czechoslovak parties over the 1968 Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia showed
that Moscow was still stubbornly fighting a rear-guard action against its
opponents. The Yugoslavs publicly rejected these Soviet maneuvers.28 However,
the PCI and the PCF passed over in silence the Soviet distortions of the
East Berlin declaration and paid less attention than before to Soviet dissident
activitybut in October 1976 the PCF publicly attacked Soviet repression of
dissidence in a meeting in Paris attended by emigre dissidents and in which
repression in Chile and Iran was also attacked--a new stage in PCF anti-
Soviet prises de position.29 In sum, the East Berlin conference institutionalized
"unity in diversity," to use Togliatti's formula, in European communism.
The European Socialists
An important but neglected aspect of Eurocommunism is its relations
with Western European socialist and social democratic parties. The PCI
2 8 Slobodan Stankovic, "Party Theoreticians Reject Soviet Supremacy," Radio
Free-Europe Research, Sept. 22, 1976 and "Yugoslav Reaction to Tough Soviet
Articles," ibid., Sept. 27, 1976.
2 9Le Monde, Oct. 22-25, 1976.
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and PCE call for close, popular-front type cooperation with socialist
parties with or without the communist party being the predominant partner.
The PCF has ertered into an electoral alliance with Mitterand's socialist
party (Parti socialiste--PS)30 in which the latter is clearly the more
powerful. The Scandinavian social democratic parties have often accepted
parliamentary support from the minuscule communist parties of that region.
Conversely, the German Social Democratic Party (Sozialdemokratische Partei
Deutschlands--SPD) and the British Labour Party, far more powerful than the
weak West German and British communist parties, have consistently maintained
an anticommunist stance, rejected any cooperation with communists, and
actively supported their opponents elsewhere, notably in Portugal.
One may best view West European socialism from the north-south
vantage point--i.e. the SPD and the Labour Party vis-a-vis the French PS,
the Spanish PSOE, and the Italian PSI. The former are social democrats
and reject cooperation with communists. The latter are socialists,
favor cooperation with communists, and reject social democracy in favor
of large-scale nationalization of industry plus, in the case of the PS,
emphasis on workers' self-administration (autogestion.)
Although all these parties are members of the Socialist International,
they divide within it on the above issues. The two main other recent
areas of controversy have been with respect to cooperation with communists
and to the Portuguese situation. The SPD has been trying to influence
30Jean-Francois Bizot, Au parti des socialistes (Paris: Grasset, 1975.)
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other socialist parties not to join popular fronts, while Mitterand's
PS has a leading role in the "southern" socialist group (including also
the PSI), which favors them. The SPD helped found and supported the Portuguese
socialist party. The SPD and the PS are competing for the leading Spanish
socialist party, the P3FOE.
Why does the PCI, the one major West European communist party which
is clearly superior to its PSI socialist ally, follow the same popular-front
policy as the PCF and the PCE, which are weaker than the PS and the PSOE?
Because, in my view, the PCI wants to participate in a governing coalition
which will have a very broad majority, and therefore its majority partner
must be the Christian Democrats. The lessons of Chile, the long Italian
tradition of foreign influence, and the fear of a rightwing coup all play
their parts. In short, the PCF and the PCE are for a reformist popular-
front strategy to compete successfully with stronger socialist parties,
while the PCI is for it to compete successfully with a stronger Christian
Democratic party.
Eurocommunism and the European Economic Community
The Soviet Union and the West European communist parties long saw the
European Economic Community (EEC) as a major, growing threat to their policies.
It symbolized capitalist affluence, American influence, and bourgeois,
anti-communist political rule. But nothing succeeds like success, and
gradually European communists realized that if one can't lick them, one must
join them.
The first was the PCI. Indeed, one of the major early results of
its reformist policies, in the early 1960s, was the PCI's participation
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in EEC activities and its advocacy that the Soviets and other European
communist parties do so as well. The PCI has for some years been represented
in the Strasbourg European and EEC parliaments and more recently the PCF has
joined it there. The Soviets have grudgingly established some minimal
contacts with the EEC. (The Chinese recently sent an ambassador to the
EEC in Brussels.) The PCE supports Spanish entry into the EEC. Conversely,
the PCF opposed French participation in the EEC, while the PS only abstained.
The PCF rejects the EEC as a capitalist, American- and West German-dominated
organization.
The Prospects
If one were to judge by the history of the communist movement, one
would have to predict that the present situation is very unstable, that
Moscow would not feel indefinitely able to tolerate the current autonomism
and reformism in European communism, if only because it would infect Eastern
Europe and the Soviet Union itself, and that it would therefore sooner or
later excommunicate the deviant parties. (The autonomist and reformist
parties themselves have no reason to break with Moscow, for that would deprive
them of any influence on the Soviets and make Moscow try to factionalize their
parties.)
But the past need not determine the future. After all, Moscow adjusted,
slowly, grudgingly, partially, to the new realities before and during the
conferences in 1969 and 1976. Excommunication of its European opponents,
after its break with the Chinese, would glaringly document the rapid decline
of its influence in the communist world and push its Eurocommunist
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opponents further along on the road toward social democracy. It may well be,
therefore, that for at least some time to come Moscow will tolerate the
present situation. This now seems to be Brezhnev's policy, carried forward
despite signs by Suslov and Ponomarev of their lack of enthusiasm for it.
Moscow will probably be unable to regain any significant amount of
the influence which it has lost over European communism, at least as long
as Yugoslavia maintains its independence from Soviet control. But Yugo-
slavia, after Tito's passing, will be a constant source of temptation for
the Soviets to fish in the troubled waters of its nationalities tensions.
The future of Yugoslavia is thus the major single source of instability
in European communism as in European politics in general. Were it again
to fall under Soviet control--an unlikely but possible prospect--Eurocommunism
would he deprived of its strongest component, Italy and the PCI would be
directly menaced by the Soviets, and detente in Europe, another precondition
for Eurocommunism, would be gravely threatened if not indeed ended.
Domestically, the PCI says that it will cooperate with the DC to
solve Italy's economic crisis. Yet the PCI-controlled trade union leaders,
like the British TUC, are anything but enthusiastic about such a policy,
and LuigiLongo, Berlinguer's predecessor, recently echoed their opposition. 3 1
The PCF continues to oppose strongly any such deflationary strategy. In
short, anything like a genuine compromessO storico threatens a split in
West European communist parties, such as occurred during and after
3 1 New York Times, Oct. 21, 1976, p. 8.
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World War I in Western social democratic parties. Finally, one Euro-
communist party may well in the future be unenthusiastic about another
one coming to power lest that it worsen its own prospects vis-a-vis
Western opposition.
Is Eurocommunism, then, genuine, or merely tactical? Would it be
abandoned if and when these parties came to power, just as it was in Eastern
Europe after 1945? No firm answer, of course, can be given. In my view its
reformist views have been genuinely accepted by most of the PCI and PCE
leaders. (They have so far been only tactically accepted by the PCF leadership.)
They are spreading among the base. Exactly because these parties will not
soon enter governments or even less take power, parliamentary reformism
will probably intensify in them, since it is their only road to power.
Eurocommunism is a process as well as a reality. The process seems to be
working in the direction of reformism. More one cannot say.
Will it also lead to a third communism schism? That issue is also still
undecided. The Eurocommunist parties are unlikely to split with the Soviets.
Whether the Soviets will split with them is less clear, but at the
moment Moscow appears to be grudgingly adjusting to Eurocommunism rather
than moving toward its excommunication.
U.S. Policy
The current discussion about U.S. policy toward Eurocommunism has been
characterized more by heat than by light. Let us first be clear about the
issues involved. Neil McInnes has Put the problem for the West well:
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. . . the appearance of communists in Latin governments
. . . would constitute a novel situation but one still
within the field of diplomacy and political negotiation
. challenge to a loose, unorganized status quo. . . .
In sam, since we are talking of a region in which
the Soviet Union could not, physically, back a putsch,
in which local communists could not manage one, and in
which NATO would not tolerate one (and all the parties
concerned know it), then the prospect of communists in
the government is, from the strictly31trategic fiew,
an inconvenience but not a disaster.
The key policy question is not what to do about the entry of the PCI
into the Italian government in the immediate future, for the PCI neither
wants nor expects to enter it. It is unlikely that it will get more
votes than the DC in the near future and it is committed to a
coalition with the DC rather than with other leftist parties. On the
contrary, the PCI wants to move toward entry so slowly that the West
will at no time decisively act against it. Nor is the issue about the entry
of the PCE into the government in Madrid: that also is most unlikely in
the near future. If the Union de la gauche wins the 1978 parliamentary
elections in France, the PCF may well enter the government, but as a minority
partner of the PS, and with Giscard still president. Thus in no West European
country is a communist party likely to dominate a governmental coalition in
the near future. Nor is any communist party likely to enter the govern-
ment in the next year or two. U.S. policy is thereforenot confronted with an
immediate problem.
If is, however, confronted with a serious long-term one. Politics
in France, Spain, and Italy are moving toward the left. If the French
3 2 Euro-Communism, pp. 69, 73.
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elections were held tomorrow, the PS-PCF coalition would probably win.
The PCI vote continues to rise, and although the compromesso storico
will come slowly, it will probably come. The left's position in Spain
is improving.
What, then, are the long-range issues for U.S. policy? Is it
in the U.S. interest that west European communist parties come closer
to power, by entry into governments or otherwise? Is Eurocommunism
a greater danger to the U.S. or to the USSR? If it is contrary to U.S.
interests, what if anything can and should the U.S. do about it, and how?
It is useful to divide one's answers into political, economic,
and military categories. As to the first, in my view in the near future
the entry of any west European communist party into government would be
viewed in Europe and elsewhere as a loss for the U.S. and a gain for the
USSR--and this perception would be the key.political reality. Moreover,
despite the long-range problems with which Eurocommunism confronts it,
Moscow would probably favor such entry because of the short-range
difficulties which it would cause the United States.
As to the second, the entry of the communist party into the
government would probably intensify the already existing economic crises
in Italy 33 and France. Thus the United States (likeWest Germany) would
be confronted with the issue of the extent to which, if at all, it would
help financially to alleviate these crises, or, conversely, whether, by
making clear in advance that it would not, it could exercise effective
pressure to prevent communist entry into the government. Conversely, one
33
Guido Carli, "Italy's Malaise," Foreign Affairs, July 19 7 6KJohn Earle,
"The Italian Economy: A Diagnosis," The World Today, June 1976.
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can argue, as the PCI 3 and some non-communist observers do, that the
U.S. should be for the entry of the PCI into the government because only
thereby, with trade union cooperation, can the Italian economic crisis be
solved or alleviated. So far, however, it does not appear that the PCI
has been willing, or perhaps not even able, to accept such decisive
cooperation with the Italian government, and one wonders whether it could
or would if it entered the government.
As to the third, the military element, this basically applies only
to Italy. A PS-PCF government in France would make French cooperation
with NATO even less than it is now, but the difference would hardly be
crucial. PCE participation in a Spanish government is so unlikely in the near
future, and the run-down of U.S. base facilities in Spain so likely that this
is also not a major policy issue. There are, however, very extensive U.S.
military bases in Italy, vital for U.S. and NATO strategy in the Mediterranean
and the Middle East. Their future is the major current U.S. policy problem
vis-a-vis Eurocommunism. While Berlinguer publicly endorsed NATO during
the June 1976 Italian election campaign, and while he most likely shares with
almost all Italians the fear that Moscow might again get hold of Yugoslavia,
the PCI's membership, more anti-NATO than the leadership, may well continue
to pressure the leadership to lower U.S. military presence.
Unless and until the PCI's base becomes reformist, more so
34See Sergio Segre (head of the PCI international department), "The
'Communist Question' in Italy," Foreign Affairs, July 1976.
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than it now is, and until the PCI abandons its continued democratic
centralism (i.e. authoritarian inner-party structure) and its support of
Soviet and opposition to U.S. foreign policies, it is in my view not in
the U.S. interest that it join the Italian government.
It will remain contrary to U.S. interests unless and until the
losses to the U.S. of PCI entry become counterbalanced by the cost to the
Soviets of stronger PCI opposition to Soviet policies. This may occur,
but it has not yet. Until U.S. gains from this possibility intersect with
and become greater than U.S. losses from PCI entry, U.S. opposition to
entry should continue.
In the meantime, the U.S. should keep in mind that the PCI's move
toward reformism has been in part influenced by western opposition to its
entry into the government, that the PCI has not yet made clear exactly
how it envisages a future Italy, that it has not yet (and indeed continues
to endorse Soviet foreign policy), and that therefore continued U.S. and
West European opposition to its participation in the government will
continue the pressure on it to make its position clear on these issues.
The same is true for other West European communist parties. 35
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This point is well made in the excellent analysis by Wolfgang Wagner,
"Kommunisten im westlichen BUndnis? Atlantische Allianz und Europaische
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For a view advocating less opposition to PCI participation, see Peter
Lange, "What Is to be Done--About Italian Communiamm," Foreign Policy,
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What, then,should the U.S. do? It should not, as too many U.S.
officials often have, declare that PCI participation in the Italian
government is "unacceptable" to the U.S. This unnecessarily and
counter-productively antagonizes all Italian nationalists. Second,
U.S. officials should indicate, when asked, that they view PCI entry as
contrary to U.S. interests, but that this is a matter for Italians, and
that they will be guided by general West European views on this matter,
notably by those of the other EEC members. (In practice, this would
mean primarily the German Federal Republic.) Third, there is no reason
why the U.S. should be expected to commit itself to massive financial
aid to Italy with the PCI in the government; as Chancellor Helmut
Schmidt has put- it, no nation is required to give aid without strings.
Fourth, it is most unlikely that the U.S. Congress would authorize
any such massive aid in the near future. Fifth, any such aid decision,
however, should also be multilateral. Sixth, since the PCI eventually
probably will enter the government, the U.S. should not unnecessarily
antagonize it. It should, for example, end the refusal of U.S. entry
visas to PCI members, as part of a general abandonment of this practice
within the context of the Helsinki Declaration.
As to France and Spain, there is little that the U.S. can or
need do. The U.S. has every right, in answer to questions, to make
clear its preference that their communist parties not enter government,
but it should equally make clear, as with Italy, that this is a choice
for their peoples and that the U.S. is not trying to prescribe what
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they should do. The French and Spanish peoples are far more nationalistic
than the Italian and any open U.S. pressure would be counter-productive.
As to the problem that Eurocommunism presents to the Soviets,
the most important U.S. policy to follow, in this as in many other
respects, is to make credibly clear to the Soviets that any Soviet
attempt to reacquire dominant influence in Yugoslavia would mean
the end of detente in Europe and the negotiation of a military
relationship between Washington and Peking to counterbalance it.
Otherwise, the U.S. can well afford to wait for tensions between
Moscow and Eurocommunism to deepen, as they probably will.
